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Abstract
The weighted updating model is a generalization of Bayesian updat-
ing that allows for biased beliefs by weighting the constituent functions of
Bayes’ rule with real exponents. In this paper I show that transforming
a distribution by exponential weighting and normalization systematically
affects the information entropy of the resulting distribution. Specifically,
if the weight is greater then one then the resulting distribution has less
information entropy than the original distribution (and vice versa). This
result provides a useful interpretation of the model, since, for example a
likelihood function with greater entropy translates to the associated data
being treated with less information content. The result also justifies using
the model as it has been used in the literature, i.e. to model biases in which
individuals treat observations as being either more or less informative than
they should.
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1 Introduction
The weighted updating model generalizes Bayes’ Rule to allow for biased learn-
ing. Despite the fact that this model has seen some use in economics and other
disciplines, there has not yet been a rigorous interpretation of the model or jus-
tification for using it. Those who use the model justify its use by appealing to
intuition. This paper eliminates this shortcoming, by showing that transforming a
distribution by weighting it and normalizing systematically affects the information
entropy of the resulting distribution relative to that of the original distribution.
By weighting and normalizing a single distribution, the entropy of the resulting
distribution decreases or increases relative to the original depending on whether
the weight is greater or less than one. This provides the interpretation that
weighting is a parametric method with which to model the treatment of data as
either more or less informative than with Bayesian updating. As such, weighted
updating embodies a theory of biased judgement, wherein these biases are a result
of the treatment of data as containing inaccurate levels of information content.
Work that utilizes the weighted updating model includes Grether (1980) and
Grether (1992), which estimate the exponential weights on the likelihood function
and the prior distribution to find empirical evidence for the representativeness
heuristic. Ibrahim and Chen (2000) introduced power priors, which allows the
researcher to consider data from previous studies by putting a weight in (0, 1) on
the likelihood function for that data and putting a weight of 1 for current data.
Van Benthem, Gerbrandy, and Kooi (2009) define a “weighted product updating
rule” and go on to prove that Bayes’ rule and the Jeffrey updating rule are both
special cases of their rule. Palfrey and Wang (2012) use weight updating to model
investor under- and overreaction to public information about financial assets in a
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model with speculative pricing. Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond (2013) use the
weighted updating model to study “non-belief in the law of large numbers”. Zinn
(2014) expands upon the basic model to allow the weights to change over time
and for individuals to discriminate between observations.
2 Interpreting the Weights
Throughout the paper, ht denotes an ordered history of observations (x1, . . . , xt).
A decision maker will consider ht as an outcome from a stochastic process with
density f(ht|θ), where θ is an unknown parameter that the decision maker con-
siders to be from parameter space Θ. Bayesian beliefs regarding the value of θ
after observing ht are completely described by the posterior distribution pi(θ|ht).
Denote the likelihood function with f(ht|θ) and the prior distribution with pi(θ),
then Bayes’ rule states that
pi(θ|ht) = f(ht|θ)pi(θ)∫
Θ
f(ht|θ)pi(θ) dθ .
Weighted updating augments Bayes’ rule with real-valued parameters α and β
as exponents respectively on the likelihood function and prior probability distribu-
tion. Denote the posterior distribution under weighted updating after observing
history ht by p˜i(θ|ht). Then the weighted updating model is given by
p˜i(θ|ht) = f(ht|θ)
βpi(θ)α∫
Θ
f(ht|θ)βpi(θ)α dθ . (1)
Both Bayes’ rule and the weighted updating model can be stated without
mention of the marginal distribution, which is not a function of θ and serves only
as a normalization, ensuring that the posterior distribution aggregates to one over
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its support.1 Thus, the weighted updating model can be displayed as
p˜i(θ|ht) ∝ f(ht|θ)βpi(θ)α. (1′)
Stating the model as in expression (1′) emphasizes how the nature of the posterior
distribution depends solely on the interaction between the prior distribution and
the likelihood distribution, and how the weights α and β affect this interaction.
2.1 Monotone Concentration and Monotone Dispersion
Consider how an exponent γ transforms a single probability distribution g(y) to
another proportional to g(y)γ. As long as γ > 0 taking g(y) to the power γ for all y
is a monotone transformation, as is dividing by the resulting marginal distribution,
which is always positive. As such, the values of y that maximize (or minimize)
g and gγ are identical. What the exponent γ affects is the concentration of the
resulting distribution. The following definition describes this notion precisely.2
Definition 1 (Monotone Dispersion, Monotone Concentration). For two non-
uniform probability distributions Γ and g on the same support Ω, Γ is a monotone
1Note that throughout the paper it is assumed that
∫
Θ
f(ht|θ)βpi(θ)α dθ is finite so that
p˜i(θ|ht) is well-defined. For many cases this assumption is innocuous because weighting a distri-
bution with an exponent and rescaling results in a distribution from the original family. However,
this assumption is not always satisfied. For example, the function (1 − p)x−p represents a dis-
tribution over x ≥ 1 if and only if p > 1. Taking such a distribution to a power α < 1/p and
doing the usual normalization does not result in another distribution, as the integral over [1,∞)
of the resulting function diverges.
2In a previous version of this paper, the concept of a monotone dispersion was given the name
“monotone spread”, a related concept due to Quiggin (1988). Note that a monotone dispersion
differs from a monotone spread in that the latter is necessarily mean-preserving.
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Figure 1: Γ is a monotone dispersion of g, g is a monotone concentration of Γ.
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dispersion of g if for all pairs (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω2 it is true that
g(ω1) = g(ω2) ⇔ Γ(ω1) = Γ(ω2), (2)
g(ω1) > g(ω2) ⇔ Γ(ω1) > Γ(ω2), and (3)
g(ω1) > g(ω2) ⇒ g(ω1)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
Γ(ω2)
. (4)
If Γ is a monotone dispersion of g then g is a monotone concentration of Γ.3
See Figure 1 for an example of two distributions that are a monotone dispersion
and concentration of one another.
Interest in monotone dispersions and concentrations is due to the fact that
when a distribution is weighted with a positive power and normalized, the result-
3Uniform distributions are excluded from Definition 1 because if either g or Γ were uniform
then the other would necessarily be uniform by condition (2), so they would be the same distri-
bution. If this is the case then conditions (3) and (4) are only vacuously true, which is not useful
for our purposes because condition (4) provides an asymmetry that allows one to compare dif-
ferent distributions. Another way of saying this is that such a restriction ensures that there are
no case in which the relations “is a monotone dispersion of” and “is a monotone concentration
of” are symmetric.
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ing distribution is either a monotone dispersion or concentration of the original
distribution depending on whether the weight is less than or greater than one, as
stated in the following theorem.4
Theorem 1. Let g : Ω → R be any non-uniform probability distribution. If
γ ∈ (0, 1) then the distribution Γ : Ω→ R, defined as
Γ(ω) ≡ g(ω)
γ∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dω
,
is a monotone dispersion of g. If it is the case that γ > 1 then Γ is a monotone
concentration of g.
Theorem 1 guarantees that a positively weighted distribution results in either
a monotone dispersion or concentration of the original, but what does it mean for
two distributions to be related in this way? Looking at Definition 1, expression
(3) implies that Γ(ω1) > Γ(ω2) whenever g(ω1) > g(ω2), so if Γ is a monotone
dispersion of g then the transformation g 7→ Γ is a monotone transformation.
This monotonicity ensures that the ordinal properties are identical within pairs of
distributions that are dispersions and concentrations of each other. In other words,
two agents with beliefs that are related by monotone dispersion or concentration
will agree on a rank ordering of events according to their likelihoods as given by
their respective beliefs.
Expression (4) describes how the cardinal properties of a monotone dispersion
or concentration differ from the original function, with a monotone dispersion
being closer to a uniform distribution. Equivalently, a concentration is an exag-
geration of the original distribution, with “higher highs” and “lower lows”. The
following theorem states these notions rigorously.
4Proofs for all results are in the appendix.
6
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g. For any ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω,
g(ω1) > g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2) ⇒ g(ω1) > Γ(ω1).
Also,
g(ω1) < g(ω2) ≤ Γ(ω2) ⇒ g(ω1) < Γ(ω1).
The following Corollary5 to Theorem 2 is used in the proof of Theorem 3,
which is stated below.
Corollary 1. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g and let ω∗ be a maximizer of
g. Then g(ω∗) > Γ(ω∗).
2.2 Measuring Dispersion
As variance is a widely used measure of dispersion, one may suspect that a mono-
tone dispersion results in a distribution with greater variance and a monotone
concentration less variance than the original distribution. For many distributions
this is indeed the case. Consider the normal distribution with mean µ and vari-
ance σ2. It is straightforward to find that taking this distribution to the power
γ > 0 results in a function that is proportional to the normal distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2/γ. After doing this manipulation one can utilize Theorem
1 to note that γ < 1 generates a monotone dispersion of the original distribution
with greater variance, while a monotone concentration with less variance is the
outcome if γ > 1.
Despite being true for the normal distribution, it is not the case for all distri-
butions that a monotone dispersion implies greater variance and that a monotone
5The appendix contains a proof of this Corollay that is independent of Theorem 2.
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concentration has less variance. Consider the beta distribution B(a, b) which is
proportional to xα−1(1−x)b−1 for parameters a, b > 0. Cases in which a, b ∈ (0, 1)
result in a u-shaped distribution, it is strictly convex with peaks at the extremes
of the support x = 0 and 1. Applying a monotone dispersion results in a flat-
ter distribution with less variance and applying a monotone concentration shifts
mass toward the end-points of [0, 1] resulting in greater variance. In particular,
consider the beta distribution B(3/4, 3/4) which has a variance of 1/10. Applying
the monotone concentration of raising this distribution to the power γ = 2 and
normalizing yields B(1/2, 1/2), which has a variance of 1/8. Thus, B(1/2, 1/2) is a
monotone concentration of B(3/4, 3/4), yet it has a greater variance, providing a
counter-example against the general statement that a monotone concentration has
less variance (and vice-versa).
The reason variance does not have a consistent relationship with monotone
dispersions and concentrations is because it is a measure of dispersion from the
mean of the distribution. For a consistent relation with monotone dispersion and
concentration it is necessary to have a measure of dispersion that is independent
of reference points. As will be shown before the end of the current section, a
distribution’s information entropy, as defined in Shannon (1948), is a measure of
dispersion or uncertainty that invariably increases for monotone dispersions and
decreases for monotone concentrations.
Definition 2 (Information Entropy, (Shannon, 1948)). For any distribution g :
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Ω→ R++, the information entropy of g is given by6
H(g) ≡ −
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω) dω.
For any distribution g and particular ω ∈ Ω, Tribus (1961) dubbed − log g(ω)
the surprisal of ω. Because − log g(ω) is decreasing in g(ω), surprisal is greater for
ω which (according to g) are less likely and, therefore, more surprising outcomes.
The logarithm ensures that surprisal is additive in the densities of independent
random variables, because for any two independent random variables X and Y
respectively distributed gX and gY , the surprisal for any particular pair of events
(x, y) is
− log gX(x)gY (y) = − log gX(x)− log gY (y).
Defining − log g(ω) as the surprisal suggests that the information entropy of a
distribution is equivalent to the expected surprisal, as entropy is equivalent to
weighting the surprisal for each ω ∈ Ω by the associated density g(ω) and ag-
gregating over Ω. Distributions with higher entropy then can be interpreted as
having higher expected surprisal. If outcomes from one distribution are, on av-
6Entropy is usually introduced using a discrete distribution g, for which the entropy is defined
analogously as H(g) ≡ −∑Ω g(ω) logc g(ω), where the base c determines unit of measure (e.g.
bits for c = 2). The concept defined in Definition 2 is usually known as differential entropy
or continuous entropy and is typically denoted with h rather than H. The continuous version
is studied because, for our purposes, its analysis is not as straightforward and the results for
discrete distributions follow by analogy.
One reason that information theorists typically present entropy using discrete densities is be-
cause the entropy of a discrete distribution can be interpreted as the average length of code
necessary for the efficient transmission of information regarding outcomes from that distribu-
tion. For a coin flip the length of the average code should be −1/2 log2(1/2) − 1/2 log2(1/2) = 1
bit per signal because it would be efficient to let, say, 1 encode heads and 0 encode tails. How-
ever, for some continuous distributions this interpretation of entropy is nonsensical because
the entropy could be negative. For example, the uniform distribution over [0, 1/2] has entropy
− ∫ 1/2
0
2 log2 2 dx = −1 bits per signal. This paper is interested in comparing the entropies of
distributions rather than interpreting entropy as the efficient average length of a message, so
the paper does not focus on discrete densities.
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erage, more surprising than outcomes from another distribution, then the first
distribution can be thought of as containing less information than the second.
Thus, distributions with higher entropy typically generate observations that have
less information content.7
The following theorem verifies the claim that transforming a distribution by
monotone dispersion results in an increase in entropy and that monotone concen-
tration decreases entropy.
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g. Then the entropy of Γ is at
least as great as the entropy of g. That is
−
∫
Ω
Γ(ω) log Γ(ω) dω ≥ −
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω) dω.
If, in addition, either of the sets {ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)} or {ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)} have
positive measure, then the inequality is strict.
3 Conclusion
This paper provides an interpretation of weighted updating as a method by which
individuals treat information as either more or less informative than under Bayes’
rule. In particular, it is shown that weighting the functions primitive to Bayes’
rule transforms the functions by monotone dispersion or monotone concentration,
and that these transformations affect the information entropy of the resulting
primitives.
7The interpretation of information entropy as a measure of the uninformativeness of a dis-
tribution is consistent with the idea that physical entropy, which is proportional to information
entropy by Boltzmann’s constant, is a measure of one’s ignorance of a system. See, for example,
the discussion in Sethna (2006, §5.3) for this interpretation of physical entropy along with a
discussion of its relationship with information entropy.
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This interpretation of weighting a distribution suggests that, on its own,
weighted updating may be appropriate to model only those biases in which in-
dividuals correctly interpret information, but for some reason do not use the
information in a rational way. Thus, for example, weighted updating may be
utilized to model biases based on self-deception8 or the cognitive limitations of
utilizing correctly interpreted data, but it may not be appropriate for modelling
the type of confirmation bias studied by Rabin and Schrag (1999), which involves
decision makers who misinterpret information. Still, there is no reason why there
should be only one type of bias affecting belief formation; one could, for example,
model individuals who misinterpret evidence using the framework of Rabin and
Schrag (1999) and then process the misinterpreted information irrationally using
weighted updating.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let γ ∈ (0, 1). Conditions (2) and (3) are satisfied im-
mediately. As g is non-uniform there exists a pair (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω2 for which
g(ω1) > g(ω2). For any such pair, multiplying each term of the relations 0 < γ < 1
by log(g(ω1)/g(ω2)) yields
0 < γ log
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
< log
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
,
which implies that
1 <
g(ω1)
γ
g(ω2)γ
<
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
.
8Self-deception typically involves individuals who downplay or overemphasize the importance
of certain pieces of evidence in a systematic way (Hirshleifer, 2001).
11
Dividing both the numerator and denominator of the center term by the normal-
izing factor
∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dω > 0 yields
1 <
g(ω1)
γ/
∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dω
g(ω2)γ/
∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dω
<
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
,
which is another way of stating that
1 <
Γ(ω1)
Γ(ω2)
<
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
.
This proves that Γ is a monotone dispersion of g. The case for γ > 1 yielding a
monotone concentration is proved analogously. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let
g(ω1) > g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2).
As Γ is a monotone dispersion of g, g(ω1) > g(ω2) implies
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
Γ(ω2)
,
which can be rearranged to obtain
Γ(ω2)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
g(ω1)
.
Now utilize g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2) to augment the above inequality to obtain
1 ≥ Γ(ω2)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
g(ω1)
.
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And so, g(ω1) > Γ(ω1). The other case implying the opposite conclusion is sym-
metric. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. As
ω∗ ∈ arg max
ω∈Ω
g(ω),
we have g(ω∗) ≥ g(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. The hypothesis that Γ is a monotone
dispersion of g implies that both Γ and g are non-uniform, so there exists some
ω0 ∈ Ω such that g(ω∗) > g(ω0). Thus,
g(ω∗)
g(ω)
≥ Γ(ω
∗)
Γ(ω)
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Note that expression (3) from Definition 1 guarantees that this inequality is strict
at ω = ω0. These conditions imply
g(ω)
g(ω∗)
≤ Γ(ω)
Γ(ω∗)
for all ω ∈ Ω,
with strict in inequality for ω = ω0. As these conditions hold for all ω ∈ Ω with
strict inequality at ω0, integrating over Ω yields
∫
Ω
g(ω) dω
g(ω∗)
<
∫
Ω
Γ(ω) dω
Γ(ω∗)
.
As both g and Γ are probability distributions, they integrate to unity over their
support, so this condition is equivalent to
1
g(ω∗)
<
1
Γ(ω∗)
,
which is true only if g(ω∗) > Γ(ω∗). Q.E.D.
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The proof of Theorem 3 requires the following two lemmas and a fact (Gibb’s
Inequality) from statistical physics.
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g. Then
sup Γ({ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)}) ≤ inf Γ({ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)})
Proof. Let b = sup Γ({ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)}) and B = inf Γ({ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)}).
Suppose for purposes of contradiction that b > B. Then completeness of the
interval (B, b) ⊂ R++ implies that there exist ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω such that Γ(ω1) > Γ(ω2),
Γ(ω1) ∈ Γ({ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)}),
and
Γ(ω2) ∈ Γ({ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)}).
By the definition of monotone dispersion and monotone concentration, Γ(ω1) >
Γ(ω2) if an only if g(ω1) > g(ω2). This, the above two conditions, and the fact
that Γ is positive on its support Ω imply
Γ(ω1) > g(ω1) > g(ω2) > Γ(ω2) > 0,
from which it follows that
Γ(ω1)
Γ(ω2)
>
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
> 1,
contradicting the fact that Γ is a monotone dispersion of g, expression (4) in
particular. Therefore it must be the case that b ≤ B. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g and let there exist some ωj such
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that Γ(ωj) > g(ωj). Then there exists r ∈ R such that
Γ(ω) > r ⇒ g(ω) > Γ(ω)
and
Γ(ω) < r ⇒ g(ω) < Γ(ω).
Proof. Corollary 1 guarantees the existence of some ω ∈ Ω such that g(ω) > Γ(ω).
Define B as in the proof of Lemma 1, and it follows that Γ(ω) ≥ B. If it is the
case that Γ(ω) > B then by definition g(ω) > Γ(ω). In summary, Γ(ω) > B
implies that g(ω) > Γ(ω).
The hypothesis that there exists some ωj such that Γ(ωj) > g(ωj) establishes
the existence of ω ∈ Ω such that Γ(ω) ≤ b, where b is defined in the proof of
Lemma 1. A symmetric argument to the above guarantees that Γ(ω) > g(ω)
whenever Γ(ω) < b.
Thus, for any r ∈ [b, B], which is non-empty by Lemma 1, it follows that
Γ(ω) > r ⇒ g(ω) > Γ(ω)
and
Γ(ω) < r ⇒ g(ω) < Γ(ω). Q.E.D.
We will make use of the following fact from the field of statistical physics.
Fact 1 (Gibbs’ Inequality). For any two probability distributions p, q : X → R++
∫
X
p(x) log p(x) dx ≥
∫
X
p(x) log q(x) dx.
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Proof of Theorem 3. By Gibbs’ Inequality
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω) dω ≥
∫
Ω
g(ω) log Γ(ω) dω,
which implies
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω)− Γ(ω) log Γ(ω) dω ≥
∫
Ω
(g(ω)− Γ(ω)) log Γ(ω) dω. (5)
Lemma 1 asserts that [b, B] is non-empty. Consider any r ∈ [b, B]. As, g and Γ
are both distributions,
0 = − log r
∫
Ω
g(ω)− Γ(ω) dω. (6)
Adding expressions (5) and (6) gives
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω)− Γ(ω) log Γ(ω) dω ≥
∫
Ω
[g(ω)− Γ(ω)](log Γ(ω)− log r) dω. (7)
By Lemma 2, r ∈ [b, B] implies that log Γ(ω)− log r has the same sign as g(ω)−
Γ(ω), so the right-hand side of expression (7) is non-negative. And so,
−
∫
Ω
Γ(ω) log Γ(ω) dω ≥ −
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω) dω. (8)
If, additionally, {ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)} or {ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)} have positive measure
then the right-hand side of expression (7) is strictly positive, so inequality (8) is
strict. Q.E.D.
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